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Abstract
How cooperation emerges and is stabilized has been a puzzling problem to biologists and sociologists since Darwin. One of
the possible answers to this problem lies in the mobility patterns. These mobility patterns in previous works are either
random-like or driven by payoff-related properties such as fitness, aspiration, or expectation. Here we address another force
which drives us to move from place to place: reputation. To this end, we propose a reputation-based model to explore the
effect of migration on cooperation in the contest of the prisoner’s dilemma. In this model, individuals earn their reputation
scores through previous cooperative behaviors. An individual tends to migrate to a new place if he has a neighborhood of
low reputation. We show that cooperation is promoted for relatively large population density and not very large temptation
to defect. A higher mobility sensitivity to reputation is always better for cooperation. A longer reputation memory favors
cooperation, provided that the corresponding mobility sensitivity to reputation is strong enough. The microscopic
perception of the effect of this mechanism is also given. Our results may shed some light on the role played by migration in
the emergence and persistence of cooperation.
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Introduction
Cooperation has been a puzzling problem to biologists,
sociologists and economists since Darwin [1–3], because it benefits
the defectors at costs to cooperators. In particular, it is interesting
to investigate how cooperative behavior emerges in our human
societies. Evolutionary game theory [4,5] is a powerful framework
for understanding the emergence of cooperation. Up to now,
a number of mechanisms [6] have been proposed to address this
issue, including kin selection [7], group selection [8,9], direct
reciprocity [10,11], indirect reciprocity [12–16], and network
reciprocity [17–21]. Particularly, indirect reciprocity and network
reciprocity have attracted intensive attention in the study of
human cooperative behaviors, because our societies are well
captured by networks, and that indirect reciprocity, which means
‘‘helpful ones will be helped by others’’, is more powerful in
shaping our cooperative behaviors in human communities than in
other animals.
Mobility, as an important characteristic of individuals in social
network [22] and also a way to realize the coevolution [23–27], has
recentlyreceivedconsiderableattentioninthestudyofcooperation.
The population structure is often captured by spatial lattices [28–
31]. Apart from population structures, the effects of mobility on the
evolution of cooperation vary with movement patterns as well. To
the best of our knowledge, there have been two types of forces that
drive the migration. One is ‘‘random driven’’. In this context, each
individual is allowed to migrate to a nearby place randomly with
a uniform probability on lattices [32,33] or to move in random
directions on continuous plane [34]. Further, moving individuals
can be distinguished [35,36] and endowed with different migration
probabilities. The criteria of discrimination could be their strategies
(cooperators or defectors) [37], or their influences [38]. The other is
‘‘payoffdriven’’.Inthesesituations,anindividualfindsanemptysite
within some region that promises the highest payoff and then jumps
toit(alsocalled‘‘success-driven’’)[39,40],oranindividualwillleave
his current place if the payoff obtained does not meet the aspiration
[41–43] or expectation [44]. In our human societies, reputation, as
thefuelfortheengineofindirectreciprocity,playsanimportantrole
in shaping our migration decisions. Yet it is still unclear how this
‘‘fuel’’-driven migration affects cooperation. Considering this, we
proposea‘‘reputation-basedmigration’’modeltoaddressthisissue.
Reputation is a kind of social information by which individuals’
past behaviors can be assessed. It has greatly contributed to
evolution of cooperation in games of indirect reciprocity. The
reputation can be simply evaluated by ‘‘image score’’ [13] or other
criterions [15,45]. In spatial games, individuals are distributed on
the nodes of the networks, and the edges represent who plays with
whom.Anindividualinteractswithhisdirectneighborsandacquires
thereputationsofthem.Inreality,peopletendtointeractwiththose
with good reputations that potentially benefit themselves, but leave
those with bad ones to avoid being exploited in the future. Besides,
individuals often have the information of their neighbors’ reputa-
tions with the rest unknown. Inspired by these, we propose a model
where migration is driven by the reputation. Therein, individuals
evaluatetheenvironmentsbythereputationscoresofneighborsand
themselves. An individual has a larger probability to leave his
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ishighcomparingtohisneighbors,revealingthefactthatindividuals
favor a preferable environment but repel a nasty one [46–50]. For
theupdatingofreputation,weincorporatememoryeffect[51]tothe
image scoring. To address how the reputation-based migration
affects the evolution of cooperation, we consider how the two
intrinsic parameters in the model affects the cooperation level: the
reputation decaying rate, which depicts a cumulative effect of
previous actions on reputation, and the mobility sensitivity to
reputation, which characterizes how sensitively reputation influ-
ences the decisions of migration.
Methods
In our model, the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) is adopted as
the paradigm to study the evolution of cooperation. For a typical
PDG, each of the two players either cooperates (C) or defects (D).
They both receive a reward R upon mutual cooperation and
punishment P upon mutual defection. When confronted with
a cooperator, the defector gains a temptation to defect T, while the
exploited cooperator acquires a sucker’s payoff S. The ranking of
the four payoff values is TwRwPwS. By setting T~b, R~1,
and P~S~0, A simplified version of PDG [17] is obtained such
that the game is controlled by a single parameter b (1ƒbƒ2),
where b indicates the temptation to defect. For the network of
social contacts, we assume that players are located on a square
lattice of L|L sites with periodic boundary conditions. Each site
can be either empty or occupied by one individual. Empty sites
represent spatial regions individuals can migrate to. We denote by
r the density of population, defined as the ratio of population size
to the number of all sites.
Initially, an equal percentage (50%) of cooperators (Cs) and
defectors (Ds) are randomly distributed in the population.
Individuals play PDG with their direct neighbors, and are updated
asynchronously in a random sequential order. In each round, an
individual is randomly picked up for updating. One round consists
of two successive processes: migration and imitation. During the
migration process, a randomly chosen individual i explores all the
empty sites within the Moore neighborhood with distance M~1
(the 8 neighboring sites). With probability Pi, which is governed by
the reputations of neighbors and himself, i migrates to a random
place among those empty sites. For the sake that i has neighbors to
interact with, those empty sites who have neighbors (non-empty
neighboring sites) will preferentially be chosen from at random. If
there is no empty site within i’s neighborhood, i just stays where he
is placed. In the imitation stage, i interacts with all his neighbors
(von Neumann neighborhood). The payoffs are accumulated.
Meanwhile, payoffs of i’s neighbors are calculated in the same
way. Then i imitates the strategy of the neighbor who has the
highest payoff (including himself), i.e., following a ‘‘best-take-over’’
rule. The reputation of i is updated at the same time. If i has no
neighbor to interact with in his current place, both his strategy and
his reputation remain unchanged during this round. A time step is
defined as many rounds of games such that each individual will on
average be chosen once. Therefore, the real number of rounds
played in one time step varies with population density r. A key
quantity that specifies the behavior of the system is the normalized
fraction of cooperators rc~Nc=(N:r) attained by averaging over
many steps after the stationary phase is achieved, where Nc is the
number of cooperators and N of all sites.
In order to account for the reputation effect in mobility, we
define an individual i’s reputation at time t as
Ri(t)~Ri(t{1):azSi(t),
where Si(t) is 1 if i cooperates at time t, otherwise being 0, and a
denotes the decaying rate. Thus an individual’s reputation value is
the weighted sum of the times he cooperated in the past games
[52]. For a?0, the memory effect vanishes and the reputation
relies mainly on his current action; for a?1, reputation value is
accumulated since the outset of the evolution.
By comparing his reputation with those of his neighbors, i
evaluates the environment and tends to leave when the
environment is not so good. Thus the influence of reputation on
mobility is implemented through determining the probability of an










where Q represents i’s neighbors and himself. The parameter c
specifies an individual’s mobility sensitivity to reputation. For
c?0, movement is insensitive to reputation and i leaves with
a probability equal to the inverse of the number of elements in set
Q, while c?? leads to the deterministic rule where i leaves with
certainty if he is the one with the highest reputation among Q, but
stays still otherwise. For the case that i is isolated, we make
a compulsory move by setting Pi~1. Considering that initially
each individual has a reputation of zero, and thus no reputation
records are available for guiding individuals’ migration activities,
we set Pi~0 if all the members in Q have a reputation equal to
zero (and setting Pi to be other constants in this case does not
change the results qualitatively). Unlike models in ref [39,40],
where migration relies on information on strategies of all
individuals in a large area, migration here requires local
information only. Note that in our model, reputation takes effect
in the migration process only, and thus no influence of reputation
on strategy updating is involved.
Results
In what follows, we present the results of numerical simulations.
We first consider the influence of temptation to defect b on the
fraction of cooperators rc. In the presence of reputation-based
migration, rc is promoted for low temptation to defect (see
Fig. 1(a)). For 1ƒbv4=3, cooperation is promoted. For
4=3vbv3=2, depending on the specific a and c, cooperation
can be enhanced or suppressed. For bw3=2, cooperation level
plummets to zero, lower than that in the absence of migration,
regardless of the values of a or c. It is shown that rc displays
discontinuous transitions and the value remains constant between
two transition points with increasing b. The phase transitions are
due to the deterministic ‘‘best-take-over’’ rule we adopt in
updating, where a strategy change occurs only if one individual
in a C-D pair imitates the other who has a larger payoff (which is
also the largest among the neighbors of the former one). Thus
phases are altered at the points where C and D have identical
payoffs. Considering all equal payoffs of C and D, potential
transition points could be: b~1, b~3=2, b~4=3, and b~2, just
as shown in Fig. 1(a), where a sharp drop of rc is observed.
Altogether, in an environment relatively favorable for cooperators,
reputation-based migration enhances cooperation, while in a harsh
environment, migration splits the surviving C clusters, accelerating
the dying out of cooperators.
The population density r has a notable impact on the
dynamical process of evolution [53], since it determines the
number of empty sites that serve as destinations of migration, and
eventually the characteristics of the network of real interactions
Reputation-Based Migration
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migration, cooperators survive throughout the whole range of r,
and rc displays a U-shaped curve. By contrast, under our
migration mechanism, there exists a threshold of r below which
rc~0. In other words, cooperation can not persist for relatively
low population density. However, as r increases, cooperation
begins to emerge and flourish. For r approaching 1, rc declines
sharply to the same value as the no migration case. These
phenomena can be intuitively interpreted. For a low density
population without mobility, the isolated individuals (also called
‘‘frozen sites’’ that never have the chances to make interactions or
strategy changes) and occasionally formed C clusters to a certain
extent maintain the cooperation level. Once mobility is in-
troduced, the potential C clusters may be devastated. In our
model, migration is based on local information. An individual
leaves the dissatisfactory place and moves to a random one. In fact,
there is no guarantee that the new place be better than the current
one. This is quite unlike the pattern in ref [39] that intentionally
searches for the best position globally, which facilitates the getting
together of cooperators far between. Consequently, in a sparsely
distributed population, migration destroys the positive assortment
of cooperators brought by spatial structure, rendering local
interactions more like a well-mixed scenario, and cooperators
vanish rapidly. This is similar to the results obtained in refs [33,55]
for low population density cases, where although different mobility
patterns are adopted, likewise, destinations do not rely on nonlocal
information but are actually random. For larger population
densities, spatially larger C clusters can be formed initially, and
migration helps to expand C clusters, thus enhancing the
cooperation. As for r?1, due to the lack of empty sites, migration
is almost impossible, and hence the result.




favors cooperation best, but intermediate values of a do, although
the optimal a varies with c. On the other hand, if c is very large,
larger a always promotes cooperation. Just as demonstrated in
Fig 2(a) for c~100 and larger, rc increases monotonously with a.
Furthermore, as a common trait for all these cs, a sharp rise in rc is
observedwhenagrowsslightlylargerthanzero.Theparametera,as
adecayingfactorinreputationscoring,reflectsthememorylengthof
the reputation.In ourstudy, we onlyconsider theinterval ofa[½0,1)
because it is unrealistic to have an infinitely long memory about
reputations in society. All the above results indicate that, reputation
effect in migration (i.e., a memory length a=0) is essential for the
establishmentofcooperation,butforalimitedmobilitysensitivityto
reputation, memory should not be too long.
The influence of c on rc is illustrated in Fig. 2(b). Generally
speaking, larger cs are better for cooperation for any value of a.
For small and moderate values of a, rc grows monotonously and
tardily with increasing c. For large values of a (e.g., 0.95), rc
becomes more strongly dependent on c and the curve displays
a sigmoid-like shape. A sufficiently large c is needed for
cooperation to establish, after which rc increases dramatically,
far exceeding those for lower as. The parameter c can also be
perceived as the capability to distinguish different reputation
values. When c is small, individuals with close reputations are
treated alike, and they have similar probabilities to migrate. When
c is large, those with higher reputations have larger probability to
move but those with lower reputations barely have the chance to
move. With larger cs, individuals’ actions are more reasonable or
accurate, which favors the evolution of cooperation.
To get a holistic view of the interplay of a and c, we plot rc as
a function of a and c in the contour form (see Fig. 3(a)). It is
obvious that for any non-zero value of a, rc increases with c.W e
also find that when a rises, the maximum of rc appreciates.
Moreover, for relatively small cs, the c value requisite to sustain
the same level of cooperation increases with a, just as demon-
strated by the contour line for rc~0:3. This has led to the non-
monotonous behavior of rc as a increases for a fixed c, as shown in
Fig. 2(a). This phenomenon implies that: For larger values of a,
individuals’ reputations are established through longer accumula-
tion of previous actions. In these cases, an individual’s decision to
move or not should be made more accurately, rather than hastily
in order to find a better environment for cooperation. However, if






































































Figure 1. Effects of temptation to defect and population density on cooperation. (a) Fraction of cooperators rc as a function of temptation
to defect b for population density r~0:7 and (b) fraction of cooperators rc as a function of population density r for temptation to defect b~1:2, for
different combinations of a and c. The cases without migration are plotted in dotted lines for comparison. Simulations are performed on a lattice of
size 100|100. The quantity rc is obtained by averaging over 2000 time steps after 18000 time steps. Each data point results from an average over
100 independent realizations. We have checked that after 18000 time steps, the value of rc is stabilized.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035776.g001
Reputation-Based Migration
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required c declines(e.g., see the contour line for rc~0:848 in
Fig. 3(a)). The cooperation level is maximized at the top right
corner of the plane, which corresponds to a?1 and the largest c.
To sum up, we conclude that, larger a promotes cooperation, as
long as the corresponding c is large enough.
Reputation induces diversity [20] in migration rates, and the
combination of parameters a and c changes the migration
probability of individuals as a whole. Figure 3(b) shows the
equivalent migration probability as a function of a and c in the
contour form after the system has reached the equilibrium.
Notably, the migration probability reaches a local minimum at the
upper right corner of the plane, which coincides with the highest
rc in Fig. 3(a). Roughly, a larger cooperation level corresponds to
a lower migration probability, and otherwise leading to the
opposite. However, some exceptions appear near the lower
boundary of the parameter plane, where both the rc and the
migration probability are low. This is due to the constraint in our
model that an individual in an all-zero reputation neighborhood
(including himself) just stays still. Within this parameter region,
population is mainly composed of defectors. Their reputations
quickly fall to zero and hence they no longer move, reducing the
migration probability.
For better understanding the mechanism of migration based on
reputation and the varying effects of different parameters, it is
useful to probe into spatio-temporal properties of the evolution
process. We first consider the case that migration is not allowed.
Figure 4(a) shows the snapshots of spatial configurations of













































































Figure 2. Influences of memory decaying rate and migration sensitivity on cooperation. (a) Fraction of cooperators rc as a function of a
for different values of c and (b) fraction of cooperators rc as a function of c in a logarithmic scale for small, medium, and large values of a. Other
parameters are: b~1:2 and r~0:7. We have excluded the case for a~1 in all simulations because it is unrealistic and it takes infinitely long time for


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Cooperation levels and migration rates in contour forms. (a) Color-coded values of rc in the (c,a) parameter space and (b)
corresponding equivalent migration probability. To obtain a data point in (b), the number of migration events is divided by the number of game
rounds over a sufficiently long time after the stationary regime is achieved. In both panels, the scale of a is linear while c logarithmic, and certain
contour lines are labeled. Other parameters are: r~0:7, b~1:2. Each data point results from an average over 10 independent realizations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035776.g003
Reputation-Based Migration















































PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e35776strategies and empty sites at different time steps. Initially, owing to
the randomly distributed strategies, those solitary cooperators
sparsely scattered among defectors rapidly die out, and only those
small C clusters survive (t~5). Then these small C clusters expand
to the limit, a state both Cs and Ds can resist the invasion of each
other on the basis of payoff advantages, and the system quickly
reaches a frozen state where no further strategy changes occur
(t~20). However, if the reputation-based migration is incorpo-
rated, the limitation for strategy propagation is broken (see
Fig. 4(b), t~100), C clusters disperse and occupy larger areas,
resulting in a remarkable rise in cooperation level. Meanwhile, C
clusters become looser, with many empty sites in them. Eventually,
system reaches a dynamic equilibrium (t~400), where part of
individuals still tend to move. While expanding, some C clusters
may split into smaller ones or vanish by chance, thus keeping rc
stable on average. If the parameter a is further increased (see
Fig. 4(c)), the C clusters become more compact, with less holes in
them. Besides, less individuals tend to move in one step, partially
because of the direct influence of parameter itself on migration
probability, and partially because of the less empty sites inside the
more densely assembled C clusters. Therefore, the real migration
rate gets reduced, just as shown in Fig. 2(b). Moreover, there are
some filament-like Ds separating or along the edge of C clusters.
With almost zero reputation values, these Ds enjoy staying with
reputation-high Cs and never move away. This also constitutes
a reason that further expansion of Cs is inhibited.
We have also plotted the snapshots of reputations when system
is stabilized in Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 4(c) (the right panels). We see that
the high-reputation areas coincide with the C clusters. Moreover,
when a is larger, there will be more individuals with medium
values of reputation. Actually, the parameter a also determines the
maximum reputation value. For an individual that always
cooperates, his reputation approaches 1=(1{a), just as illustrated
in the snapshots. For a larger a, reputations show a more smooth
transition from the highest to zero centering on C clusters. This is
crucial for stabilizing cooperation, because the hierarchies in
reputation values deter individuals in the vicinity of high-
reputation ones from moving away, and this ‘‘viscosity’’ spreads
by layers, leading to more compact C clusters.
Cooperators at the boundary of C clusters may have different
migration probabilities from those in the interior of C clusters. We
say a cooperator is at the boundary if he is adjacent to at least one
defector, or in the interior otherwise. By r we define the ratio of
the average migration probability of boundary Cs to that of
interior Cs, and the time evolution of r is illustrated in Fig. 4(d). It
is found that large a and c correspond to small r. In turn,
a decrease in either a or c results in a larger r. We should stress
that a relatively low boundary migration probability is essential in
promoting cooperation under our mechanism. If a cooperator at
the boundary moves too frequently, it is quite likely that he jumps
into a sea of defectors and finally dies out. Nevertheless, a high
migration rate makes clusters looser, thus more susceptible to
defectors. Therefore, the ideal mode is that: Cs at the boundary
hold the position and defense the frontier, waiting for the
reinforcement of Cs from the interior. When local advantages
are formed, they strike back and expand the territory. In our
model, high reputation individuals are more likely to be dissatisfied
and tend to move. By contrast, low reputation ones will be pleased
to stay next to the high ones. Consequently, to make C clusters
stable and compact, on one hand, reputation hierarchy is needed,
and on the other, migration can not be made too frequently or
blindly [32,34,37]. Both of them require a large a and a large c.
We also investigate the robustness of the results by reversing the
orderofmigrationandimitation(seeFig.5),andfindthattheresults
are qualitatively unchanged. However, the cooperation level is
slightly reduced and it requires larger population density for
cooperation to establish. The reduction of cooperation should be
ascribedtothefactthat,ifthestrategyimitationprecedesmigration,
an individual will not be able to avoid the bad environment in
advance [32]. Additionally, we have checked the case in which the
migration range is enlarged and find that cooperation is not further
promoted (see Fig. 5). The results simply imply that, without
a knowledge of the information on destinations of migrations
[41,47,55], a long range move could be more risky, or sometimes
disastrous, because the movement may be from a bad place to an
even worse one.
Discussion
To sum up, we propose a new model to investigate how mobility
affects the evolution of cooperation. In this model, individuals
evaluate their environments by the reputations of neighbors and
Figure 4. Illustrations of some microscopic properties. (a) Snapshots of distributions of cooperators and defectors at different time steps in
the absence of migration. rc is 0.5, 0.26, and 0.27 for t~0, t~5, and t~20, respectively. (b) Snapshots of strategy (left and middle panels) and
reputation (right panel, t~400) for a~0:5 and c~500. rc is 0.39 for t~100 and 0.52 for t~400. (c) Snapshots of strategy (left and middle panels) and
reputation (right panel, t~400) for a~0:95 and c~500. rc is 0.44 for t~100 and 0.71 for t~400. (d) Time evolution of the ratio r of migration
probability of boundary Cs to that of interior Cs. The dotted line r~1 is shown in the figure as a baseline. We have checked that by the time t~20 for
(a) and t~400 for (b) and (c), the system has reached the equilibrium state. The color coding for strategy snapshots is as follows: blue or green
represents a cooperator; red or yellow represents a defector; white represents an empty site. Particularly, green and yellow ones are those who will
migrate to new places in this time step. For all the above panels, simulations are carried out for b~1:2, r~0:7, and one realization, starting from the
same initial strategy distribution shown in Fig. 4(a) the left panel (t~0).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035776.g004







































Figure 5. Influences of migration range and the order of
migration and imitation. Fraction of cooperators rc as a function of
population density r is shown in the figure for 4 different cases. For the
first two cases, the migration range is enlarged to the Moore distance of
M~2 and M~3, respectively. For the other two cases, the order of
migration and imitation is reversed such that migration comes after the
strategy imitation. For all the above cases, b~1:2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035776.g005
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migrate to a random nearby site if his reputation is higher than
those of neighbors. We explore the effects of the two intrinsic
parameters: reputation memory length and mobility sensitivity to
reputation. It is found that both the memory length and the
mobility sensitivity to reputation significantly change the dynam-
ical process of evolution. We conclude that this migration
mechanism enhances cooperation for relatively large population
density and not very high temptation to defect. For any given
reputation memory length, a higher mobility sensitivity to
reputation is always better for cooperation. As reputation memory
length increases, cooperation can be maximized at a higher level
given that the corresponding sensitivity is large enough. We also
provide a microscopic perception of the effect of this mechanism.
In agreement with previous studies [32,33,37], our results show
that high probabilities of mobility inhibit cooperation. The
reputation-based migration mechanism also induces diversity in
migration probabilities, which have been shown to promote
cooperation [37,38]. Different from theirs, the diversity in
mobilities in our model is not a prescribed assumption, but
a consequence of the reputation-based migration. Thus it is more
reasonable. Our work may shed some light on how migration
affects the evolution of cooperation.
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